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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LOWELL E. PARRISH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THEODORE H. TAHTARAS,
and JOSEPHINE
TAHTARAS,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No. 8514

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
S'T.A:TEMENT OF FAfCT
The Respondent adopts the Statement of Facts
.set forth by the appe1lants, but adds thereto the
following material facts :
In addition to the income from the operation
of a restaurant, appellants also had income from
real estate rentals (R. 164). No evidence was adduced by appellants as to t;tieir income or financial
ability to finance a home of the size and style dictated and approved by them.
The appellants had Mr. Parrish, as an archiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

teet and friend, help them select a lot in Indian
Hills at 1510 Ute Drive. They had very definite
ideas as to the size of the house and the number
of rooms. Mr. Tahtaras testified:
"Q. I see. Now when you went up on the hill,
what conversation, if any, took place between Mrs.
Tahtaras and Mr. Parrish?
A. Well we were on the lot at home or on the lot?

Q.

On the lot.

A.

On the lot?

Q.

Yes.

do you mean

A. We stood on some part of the lot there
and Mrs. Tahtaras started telling Mr. Parrish about
\Vanting three bedrooms and a utility room upstairs
and a nice kitchen of course, and a living room
and a dining room and two and a half baths, I
remember, two and a half baths. So they talked
about it a little while. I wasn't saying much, they
were doing the talking about what the Mrs. wanted."
(R. 270)
Mrs. Tahtaras advised Mr. Parrish as to the
minimum rooms in the house:

''A.

In substance Mrs. Tahtaras said she desired three bedrooms on the main floor, that she desired her living and dining room combined and that
2
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she \vanted a breakfast room or a dinette off the
kitchen, and her utility room upstairs and a two
cai' garage, and a recreation room downstairs that
n1ust be corapleted when the house was completed."
(R.28)
These requirements were in addition to the
one that the dwelling be designed like Mr. Parrish's
own home. See Exhibit 9.
Exhibits 10 and 11 are the final specifications
and drawings on the dwellings as finally approved
by the appellants and then used as the basis for
taking the first bids. The areas and details had al1
been approved step by step by appellants through
the preliminary drawings, schematics and final
\Vorking plans. ( R. 12 to 30)
Appellants themselves suggested two contractors to whom drawings and specifications were sent
for bidding. (R. 47). The record is undisputed on
the testimony of Mr. Parrish that the reasonable
cost of construction of the dwelling as designed was
$12 . 00 to $14.00 per square foot; that his own home
of comparable size and design cost $62,000.00 (R.
51), and that a very similar house built at the same
time cost $12.35 per square foot. (R. 174).
The very significant facts must be included
regarding the excessive bids because of appellants'
"1egal involvements" (R. 86) and their credit problems., (R. 173 and 177).
3
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Also the record shows the continuing willingness of Mr. Parrish to cut down the plans to reach
lower bids for appellants, as reflected in the testimony of Mrs. Tahtaras:
''A. Yes, he says, ''Well, I am revising the
plans" he said. He said, "I can cut it way down
for you to meet your price.", and so then we agreed
with him. He thought he would, you know-and
then I guess that's all that was said." (R. 257)

S:TATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS REQUESTED THE ARCHITEC'TURAL SERVICES OF MR. PARRISH, APPROVED
THE DESIGN, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS
FOR THEIR HOME AND ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO
PAY FOR THE SAME.
POINT II
THE APPARENTLY EXCESSIVE BIDS RESULTED FROM THE LAWSUITS AND CREDIT DIFFICULTIES OF THE APPELLANTS.
POINT III
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT ARE
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE
VALUE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES RENDERED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE APPELLANTS REQUESTED THE ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES OF MR. PARRISH, APPROVED
4
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THE DESIGN, DRAWINGS AND SPECIFICATIONS
FOR THEIR HOME AND ARE LEGALLY BOUND TO
PAY FOR THE SAME.

The record, as testified to by all parties, shows
that the appellants had been neighbors to Mr. Parrish for several years and were familiar with his
work as an architect and particularly with the new
home designed and built by him on "I" iStreet. They
visited at this new home and decided that they
wanted one like it.
To this end, they had Mr. Parrish assist them
in the selection of a sloping view lot in Indian Hills
and then requested that he design for them a two
level house "as good as" his. In fact, they were
very definite as to what this house must contain,
including three bedrooms on the main floor, along
with two ti'led bathrooms, living room, dinette,
kitchen. Then they required that the lower floor
have a large recreation room, a sewing room and
a half bath with the usual appurtenances. Step by
step as the planning developed, Mr. Parrish met
with the appellants and reviewed the design, size
and placement of the required rooms and finally
came up with a full set of drawings and specifications to meet their demands. Mrs. Tahtaras was particularly anxious for certain details and Mr. Tahtaras seemed agreeable to letting her have anything
she wanted.
5
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This actual planning process covered a period
from the latter part of May, 1954 when the first
schematic drawings were submitted until November 1954 when the finished drawing were approved
and ready for the taking of bids. This period allowed the parties mature reflection upon the proposed undertaking and does not show a hasty illconceived venture. Mrs. Tahtaras wanted a home
as good as the one occupied by Mr. and Mrs. Parrish and she visited in their "I" Street house, had
conferences there concerning the design of her own
house and suggested revisions to meet her own requirements.
Can the appellants now be heard to say that
they should not pay for this professional service
rendered at their instance and request and solely
for their benefit? Yet that is their position. The
sole excuse offered for their refusal to pay is that
the bids for the construction exceeded their desired
maximum cost. No complaint is made as to the
style of design, the number of rooms, their placement or the materials as obvious1y such are the
items that they desired and that they insisted upon
and required to be a part of the drawings and specifications.
On the issue of maximum cost, the Court found
that:
'''Defendants employed plaintiff to draw
6
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plans for a building, not to exceed $65,000,
including the architects' but not the cost of
the lot.
Plaintiff could have cut the plans to get
bids of $65,000 less fees or $60,185.18.
Defendants abandoned their house building project.
Defendants are not entitled to any return
of fees paid.
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment, damage
calculation on quontum meruit.
Fee if work had been completed 87o
of $62,579 is $5,207.12 reduced to maximum
$4,814.82
of 87o of $60,185.12
Less lJi al~ocated to building
1,203. 70
suspension
Less Vs allocated to reducing
the plans to secure bids
@ $60,185.18
601.85
Less amount paid
1,300.00
Judgment for plaintiff and
against defendants
$1,709.27
(R. 324).
The law relating to a quasi-contracts is based
upon the equitable principle that a person shall
not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the
expense of another, and on the principle that whatsoever it is certain that a man ought to do, that the
law supposes him to have promised to do. ( 17 C.J .S.
324)
7
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The Court had before it the record of extensive architectural services rendered in the design
of a fine dwelling to meet the demands of the appellants. The record that the appellants approved
of these drawings and specifications and requested
Mr. Parrish to assist them by seking out contractors to build the dwelling. They selected two such
contractors to whom invitations for bids were sent.
All of this part of the services by Mr. Parrish was
of a special nature in accomodating the appellants.
Even after the bids came in and were considered
too high by the appellants (we shall touch upon the
reasons later) they still requested Mr. Parrish to
perform more professional services in the modification of the plans and specifications to come within
the $65,000.00 maximum figure imposed by the
appellants after they had already dictated and approved of the general size, number and style of the
rooms and exterior of the dwelling. Once again bids
were requested and again rejected by appellants,
and Mr. Parrish was willing and ready to further
reduce the design and specifications and to seek
lower bids (R. 257 & 259) but appellants withdrew
and decided to purchase a house. (R. 260)
The Court's decision appears to be based upon
the reasonable value of the services on a quantum
meruit theory, there are I1Uinerous facts which sus.:
tain the legal premise for this :
8
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Appellants orally hired Mr. Parrish, consulted with him, approved the designing and
dictated the general size, style and content
of the proposed residence;
Appellants on two occasions recognized
their employment of Mr. Parrish by paying
to him $300.00 and $1,000.00 repsectively on
account;
Appellants signed a written contract
with Mr. Parrish after his work had already
been partially performed, which contract confirms the intention to use his services, and
then compensate for the same;
Mr. Parrish testified as to the reasonable
value of the services rendered and no contradictory evidence was adduced;
Appellants, because of their own credit
problems, discharged Mr. Parrish and withdrew from the proposed construction of the
dwelling in January of 1955.
This problem has been considered by the courts
on other occasions. The general rule is stated: If
an architect renders services and there is no agreement respecting compensation, he is entitled to be
paid the reasonable value of his services. 3 AM. J ur.
1004, Annotation, 20 A.L.R. 1357.
The crux of the matter serns to turn on the
question of whether or not the appellants, by refusing to pursue the modification and re-bidding
on the house, could then eliminate their accrued
obligation to pay Mr. Parrish for his services render9
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ed up to that time. It is th~ attitude of appellants
that Mr. Parrish acted at his own peril i:n tal\:in6
bids when the same exceeded the expectations of
the appellants. They seem to forget that Mr. Parrish was acting as their agent and as an accomodation in the taking of bids.- They had dictated two
of the prospective contractors and he selected the
others to whom invitations to bid were offered.
The record shows that it is not uncommon for
plans to be revised by elimination of areas and detai'ls to reach lower prices. An architect attempts
to get the very most he can for a client at the in-·
ception and if the bids are too high, then the process
of gradual elimination starts by reduction of the
drawings and specifications to seek out lower bids
from contractors. Appellants have not alleged or
contended that they imposed any time limits or date
restrictions upon Mr. Parrish either as to original
design or the revisions, but now seek to evade their
just liabilities by changing their 1ninds and discharging him in the course of his services and prior
to completion.
Have appellants been fair in tl1is matter? We
think not. They were the ones that inYited Mr. Parrish to design a house for them as beautiful as the
Parrish home on "I" Street. (R. 196). The appellants had familiarized then1selves with the Parrish
home and selected a beautiful view lot location in
10
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a new subdivision, Indian Hills, for a similar home.
In addition, they imposed upon Mr. Parrish minin1um requirements such as three bedrooms on the
r.aain floor, a breakfast area adjoining the kitchen
overlooking the view, similar types of materials
to the Parrish home, recreational areas downstairs,
"a beautiful home, one that people would look at,
something that people would be attracted toward
as they drove by they would stop and look at." (R.
201)
Now they are unhappy because such a home
was designed for them, but the cost exceeded their
expectations. It was not until the home had been
fully designed and the working drawings approved
that the appellants imposed the $65,000.00 maximum figure upon their architect. (R. 45 and 206)
This restriction having been so lately imposed after
the basic design, materials, style and details had
been agreed upon, should be considered by the court
in determining whether or not it was reasonable for
appellants to cut short Mr. Parrish in his efforts
to scale such down to where acceptable bids could
be procurred. Mr. Tahtaras had told Mr. Parrish
to "keep working on it." "The sooner the better".
(R.284)
Appellants' appetite for a beautiful home apparently far exceeded their willingness to pay for
what they wanted. Just what is the responsibility
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of an architect to the client when the client dictates the requirements and approves the drawings
at each step of the way? "Good faith and loyalty
to his employer constitute a primary duty of the
architect." 3 Am. Jur. 1000.
"An architect, by every contract, implies
that he possesses skill and ability, including
taste, sufficient to enable him to perform the
required services at least ordinarily and reasonably well, and that he will exercise and apply in the given case his skill, ability, judgment, and taste reasonably and without neglect. The duty owing to his employer is essentially the same as that which is owed by
any person to another where such person
holds himself out as possessing skill and ability in some special employment and offers his
services to the public on account of his fitness
to act in the line of business for which he may
be employed. The skill and diligence which he
is bound to exercise are such as are ordinarily
required of architects. He must provide for
reasonable strength and for proper material
and character of construction, and he must
keep abreast of the improveme11ts of the times.
'The architect's undertakii1g, however, in the
absence of a special agreen1ent, does not imply or guarantee a perfect plan or satisfactory result, but he is liable only for failure
to exercise reasonable care and skill. * * *"
3 Am. Jur. 1001.
Your court considered a somewhat sin1ilar problem on architectural fees in Headlund v. Daniels,
167 Pac. 1170, 50 Ut. 381. Afte1~ work had been
12
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done by the architect and some drawings produced,
he estimated the costs of remodeling the theatre
would not exceed $30,000.00. The actual remodeling
cost was $77,000.00. The owner refused to pay the
architecural fees because of the tremendous increase
in costs. The judgment of the lower court in favor
of the architect for his fees was affirmed. There the
architect's plans were used and the remodeling completed. But the court seemed to emphasize that the
excessive cost was not due to the carelessness, negligence or incompetency of the architect.
"A contract may be -made in which the
sum named is only by way of estimate, and
where the instructions given require the preparation of p1ans and specifications for the
construction of a building according to the
expressed wishes of the owner as to size,
method, and details of construction, and mere
nonconformity in the cost of construction under the plans and specificationas with the
amount so estimated does not prevent a recovery." 6 C.J.S. 310
See also Schwender v. Schrajt, 141 N.E. 511,
246 Mass. 523.
POINT II
'THE APPARENTLY EXCESSIVE BIDS RESULTED FROM THE LAWSUITS AND CREDIT DIFFICULTIES OF THE APPELLANTS.

The evidence in the record shows that nearly
four and one-half months of architecural services
had been rendered before appellants, when inspect13
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing the working drawings, finally car{le up with
the restriction of $65,000.00 maximum cost. They
would have you think that Mr. Parrish, who proceeded in good faith in his professional services,
had done something wrong in not procuring a declaration on price at the outset. The friendly, neighborhood relationship of the parties did not dictate
such a contractual condition when the appellants
had told him to design a home as good as his on "I"
Street. He and they knew the materials, style and
details in that home. They had watched its construction and had viewed it and visited in it when completed. Also they dictated the size and character for
incorporation in their new house.
What is there in the record that would have
advised Mr. Parrish of their unexpressed price restrictions prior to this time? Appellants, in a play
for sympathy, have emphasized that they own a
small restaurant on West 3rd South where he works
one shift as a cook and Mrs. Tahtaras works part
time as a waitress. They omitted any reference to
the fact that appellants owned "certain real estate
rentals," (R. 164) a11d that they had bought two
different homes in very desirable neighborhoods during the course of the matters testified to, one on
upper Sheridan Road and one at 2559 East 13th
So. In addition they had purchased the view lot in
Indian Hills upon which the new dwelling was to
be erected.
14
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These were not people unfamiliar with property
and money. At no time did they tender a financial
statement of their assets and income to support the
intimation that they could not afford the house they
asked Mr. Parrish to design for them.
Now let us look at the bids that were received,
in light of this background and the fact that Mr.
Tahtaras was then involved in litigation in the District Court in two lawsuits over commissions and
contracts on the sales of some of his real estate holdings. (R. 70 and 294) Mr. Tahtaras reiterated that
he was having some credit difficulties.
The first bids received on the original design
with all of the details were:
Earl Belknap
$62,589.00
Stewart L. Carlson 80,562.00
Hamer Culp, Jr.
82,500.00
Alan E. Fors
92,500.00
Then Mr. Parrish revised the drawings and specifications after consultation with appellants, reducing the square footage from 4500 feet to 3800 feet.
The bids on this reduced house ran, $73,280.00 and
$75,987.00. These were undoubtedly too high because
of the 'legal involvements and credit problems of
appellants. A contractor cannot be blamed for bidding excessively high when he is to do business with
a man who was already in court on two alleged
breaches of contract.
15
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The only proper rule in such a case seems to
be to ascertain what would be the reasonable cost
of constructing such a dwelling. Mr. Parrish testified, without contradiction, that from his years of
experience, and from records of construction of a
similar house at the same time, the reasonable cost
of construction of such a home as he had designed
would be between $12.00 to $14.00 per square foot.
Let us multiply the 3800 square feet on the revised
plan by $14.00 per square foot. We get $53,200.00,
a figures well within the limit of $65,000.00 which
the court found had been imposed by the appellants.
Apparently the two contractors bidding the revised
plans had added $20,000.00 "scare" money as a
hedge against possible litigation with Mr. Tahtaras
should they have to sue him for breach of contract.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, Mr. Parrish
was ready and willing to cut down to meet appellants' price. (R. 257) However, Mr. Tahtaras had
called Mr. Belnap, the original low bidder who had
withdrawn his bid, and asked him to bid on the
revised plans. Still he could not get bids as low
as he wanted then1. When he met with Mr. Parrish
and discussed the last bids, Mr. Taharas said, "Now
you will have to forget it." (R. 287)
The equities of this n1atter certainly predominate in favor of Mr. Parrish and against the appellants. It is about like the situation which might
16
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exist if a client requested his lawyer to prepare, revise and amend an extensive trust agreement to
assist him in the disposition of his properties. Then
because one of his sons has offended him, the client
refuses to execute the trust and then refuses to pay
his lawyer.
Here too, because of the "wild" bidding of the
contractors evidently because of their knowledge
of the two pending 1aw suits with appellants on alleged breach of contract, appellants will not build
their house and will not pay for the professional
services rendered. It would appear that the proposed
contractors were more prudent than Mr. Parrish in
recognizing appellants' apparent penchant for
breaching contracts and involving in litigation.
POINT III
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT ARE
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF FOR THE
VALUE OF THE ARCHITECTURAL SERVICES RENDERED.

The trial court filed a memorandum of his decision ( R. 324) , and then signed and entered the
Findings of Fact and Judgment. (R. 13-16) There
is substantial evidence in the record to support each
and a:Il of the Findings of Fact. As we read the brief
of appellants, they only take issue with the court on
the following Findings:
17
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No.4 and No. 10. The first finds the $65,000.00
limitation of cost and the second denies a $45,000.00
cost limitation. Both briefs in the statement of facts
affirm the existence of testimony to establish the
court's findings. Mr. and Mrs. Parrish testified
as to the $65,000.00 limit and Mr. and Mrs. Tahtaras admitted the conference, but claimed that
they restricted the cost to $45,000.00. The trial
court saw and heard the witnesses and for good
cause elected to believe Mr. and Mrs. Parrish.
No specific exceptions have been taken as to
the other Findings. As indicated above, the trial
court has the prime opportunity to see and hear the
witnesses, examine the exhibits and study the attitudes expressed by the words and actions of each
one. Upon this premise, he has found in favor of
the plaintiff and ample evidence exists to sustain
each Finding.
From a legal viewpoint the appellants attempt
to assail the judgment on two major fronts:
(a)

Appellants claim that the. court
erred in permitting recovery on
quantum meruit.

(b)

Appellants assert that when Mr.
Parrish failed to so revise the plans
the first tin1e to procure bids under
the $65,000.00 level, then he cannot
further revise them or recover for
his services rendered.
18
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On the issue of quantum meruit we not that
defendants' answer denied the express contract between the parties and then by way of counterclaim
set up a different purported oral agreement and
alleged failure to perform. ( R. 3) In the course of
trial it appeared to the court that recovery, if any,
must be based upon the theory of quantum meruit.
(R. 119) The defendants and their counsel were
there and then advised that the proceedings would
continue upon that theory and plaintiff was given
leave to amend the complaint in conformity therewith. A second cause of action on quantum meruit
was then alleged. In connection with appellants'
motion for new trial an affidavit was filed by Mr.
Rose alleging those facts and stating that he was
incapable of meeting the issues fully and fairly.
However, no allegations were made as to what different or any evidence would have been tendered,
hence no rea1 value can be assigned to this motion
and affidavit.
In the supplement page #19 filed by appellants for their brief, they refer to two recent Utah
cases, both of which sustain our position, rather
than that of appellants. Morris v. Russell, 236 Pac.
(2d) 451, 120 Utah 531 involved an action for services rendered. A specific contract was alleged by
plaintiff and denied by defendant. 'The count for
quantum meruit was first stricken and then restored:
19
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"The essence of the defendants' admission of an express contract here is in fact a
denial of the express contract alleged by the
plaintiff; they merely admitted that the
plaintiff was to work for them, but denied
that they were to pay for the same. That being
so, it was not error for the plaintiff to have
his case submitted both on the express contract which he claimed and the defendants
denied, and also on quantum meruit, the same
as if there had been a general denial both of
the services rendered and also the obligation
to pay therefor.
* * * "'The adding of the quantum meruit
count, was the equivalent of permitting an
amendment to conform to the proof. The defendants were in no worse position than if the
quantum meruit count had not been there in
the first place. There is no showing that the
defendants were mislead or prevented from
presenting all their evidence or in any way
prejudiced by reinstating the count."
In Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp. 264 Pac. (2d)
279, 1 Utah 2d. 175, the situation is somewwhat
different. Therein again there was a dispute as to
the terms of con1pensation for an employee. The
trial and complaint were under the theory of an
express agreen1ent. Judgment was on the basis of
quantum meruit. This judgment was reversed because "No effort was made to amend the complaint
to conform to any different proof nor any proof
affirmatively offered to establish a quantum meruit
theory." The Mor·ris v. Russell case (supra) was
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discussed and differentiated on the basis that the
defendant in the Taylor case had not been called
upon to meet the issue of quantum meruit.
These and other cases affirm Utah's acceptance of the quantum meruit theory of recovery in
actions for services rendered, as in ours. Here the
parties were advised early in the trial that quantum
meruit was the theory of the case. Opportunity was
afforded all to present evidence on this. The plaintiff did so and establishe dthe reasonable value of
the services rendered. The defendants, now appellants, fail to state what, if any, different evidence
they would have adduced. Ammendment of the complaint in conformance with this quantum meruit
theory and the proof was duly al'lowed.
The last theory of appellants to be considered
is their claim that the failure of Mr. Parrish to
modify the drawings and specification to procure
sufficiently low bids before appellants decided not
to build, robs plaintiff of any right to recover. The
case of Schwender v. Schraft (supra) 141 N.E. 511
involved architectural services. The owner was ready
to spend $40,000.00 but insisted that special features
be incorporated in the structure. Bids exc~eded the
proposed $40,000.00; revision of the plans to eliminate some features were made and still the bids
were too high; again the plans were revised downward in a futile effort to reach the price; and then
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defenda11t decided not to proceed. Recovery was
awarded to the architect for his fees. The reasoning
was based upon the premise that the design was
''according to the expressed wishes of the owner as
to size, method and details of construction. In such
a case, mere non-conformity in the cost of construction tlnder the plans and specifications with the
amount so estimated does not prevent a recovery."
A general statement of the law is found at 6
C.J.S. 328 referring to the rule of damages to an
architect where the owner has breached his obligation as here :
"and, in an action on a quantum meruit in the
case of part performance, it is the reasonable
value of the services rendered.''
Supporting cases are cited. The evidence of the plaintiff showed the many details of the services rendered and the reasonable value thereof. Not one item
of the services was denied by the appellants.
CONCLUSION
Whether the contract is specific, implied or
quasi, the undisputed rule is that:
''one who prevents performance of a contract
by the other party may not avail himself of
the wrong and the other party is excused
from fulfilling the contract." 17 C.J.S. 966
Here we have Mr. Parrish ready and able to further
reduce the drawings and specifications so as to
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n1eet the price requirements, but appellants just
decided not to bother and terminated his employrnent. They cannot by such arbitrary unilateral action escape liability for the reasonable value of the
services rendered to that date. There is no pretense
on appellant's part that they had prescribed a time,
limit beyond which Mr. Parrish could not go. No
violation as to type, style, detail or appearance of
design is asserted by them. They have impetuously
decided not to take further bids or permit Mr. Parrish to adjust the details of the house to accomodate
their pocketbook and their whims at the same time.

If the rule were otherwise, great injustice
would be done to professional men, laborers, technicians and other employees. The caprice of the employer would measure the compensation rather than
the reasonable value of the services.
It is submitted that the judgment of the lower
court is fully sustained in law and in equity and
should be affirmed.
Respectfu1ly submitted,
HARRY D. PUGSLEY
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON
Attorneys for Respondent
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